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I. INTRODUCTION
Assume that you have just accepted an associate attorney position at a
top-notch national law firm with offices on the east coast and on the
west coast, and with clients in several different states throughout
America. Instead of the standard $125,000 a year starting salary for an
associate with your stellar credentials, your starting salary is only
$95,000, but the law firm persuaded you to take the job by promising a
nice bonus if your yearly billable hours totaled at least 2500 hours. To
further sweeten the pie, the law firm promised that you would receive
the best health insurance with extensive medical coverage and no
deductibles.
On the first day of work at the law firm, while filling out various
employment papers, you discovered that the law firm offers, as an
employee benefit plan, only one Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) funded by an insurance policy from an insurance company.
And, to obtain the promised heath coverage, you must enroll in that
HMO. Being young, healthy, and smart, you enrolled in the HMO,
thinking that you probably would not need medical care before your one
year anniversary with the firm, which was the length of time that you
expected to work for that law firm. However, two months into that job,
you developed severe stomach pains. Your HMO primary care physician
diagnosed an ulcer, that he attributed to stress from your having to work
so hard as a beginning associate, and prescribed medication to treat the
condition. When the pain would not go away, that physician treated
your pain by prescribing different types of medication over the next sixmonth period. Finally, after some prodding, the physician telephoned
the HMO’s utilization reviewers and requested authorization to send you
to a specialist.
However, the utilization reviewers rejected the request because they
believed that a specialist was not medically necessary. Therefore, the
primary care physician continued his efforts to control your pain by
prescribing yet another type of medication. But, the pain would not go
away. So, on your own volition and at your own expense, you went to a
specialist. After several x-rays and other diagnostic procedures, the
specialist diagnosed stomach cancer and scheduled you for immediate
surgery. The specialist told you that the primary care physician’s failure
to diagnose the stomach cancer when he first treated you has caused a
thirty-three percent reduction in your chance of survival and that, given
the specific type of cancer, your prognosis is not good.
You engaged an attorney who filed a five million dollar lawsuit
against the HMO and the primary care physician, alleging general
negligence against the former and medical malpractice against the latter.
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Months into the litigation, the physician gave you a nice settlement.
However, the HMO filed a motion for summary judgment against you,
alleging that the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)1
preempts your state tort lawsuit and that your only recourse is to file a
federal lawsuit under ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions, where your
damages will be limited to the monetary value of the denied benefit—
which at a minimum will be the $150.00 out of pocket expense that you
incurred when you first saw the specialist, and which at a maximum will
be the total dollar amount you spent on all medical care from the
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). An ERISA plan is any medical benefit plan
that an employer offers to its employees and beneficiaries when the employer’s business
affects interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C § 1002 (2000). When an employee or beneficiary
who receives medical benefits under an ERISA plan suffers an injury because either the
ERISA plan or an HMO administrator of the plan improperly denies medical benefits,
the employee can bring a civil cause of action for damages under relevant state statutory
or tort law. Or, the employee may file a lawsuit under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). If the employee brings the lawsuit
under state law, ERISA’s preemption clause will preempt it if it “relates to” the ERISA
plan by having either a “reference to” or a “connection with” the plan. See infra note 8
and accompanying text. See generally Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause:
Progress Towards a More Equitable Preemption of State Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 207, 216
(2001) (discussing court cases that analyze whether various types of state statutory and
tort laws are preempted by ERISA’s preemption clause).
On the other hand, if the injured employee files a claim under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions, the employee’s remedies are limited to either an injunction,
a clarification of rights to the benefits, or a damage award that equals the monetary value
of the benefits that were denied by the plan or its HMO administrator. 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a). However, because § 1132(a) does not allow compensatory and punitive
damages, many injured employees will file state law claims and hope that they will
escape ERISA’s preemption. One way to avoid ERISA’s preemption is to show that the
state law claim is premised upon a state law insurance regulation under the protection of
ERISA’s saving clause. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). There will be no preemption
if the saving clause does protect the law or lawsuit, and the employee may pursue a state
law claim. However, the employee still might not be able to get compensatory and
punitive damages if the claim for damages conflicts with the types of limited remedies
that § 1132(a) offers. This is so because the Supreme Court has implied that one cannot
use the saving clause to protect a state law or lawsuit from preemption when that state
law or lawsuit seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, or both, as such damages
are not allowed under § 1132(a). Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51–57
(1987).
Therefore, the main purpose of this Article is to show that, pursuant to a plain meaning
interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause and preemption clause, the Court should hold
that a state law or lawsuit that falls within the scope of the saving clause escapes
preemption by both ERISA’s preemption clause and by § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement
remedies. In other words, § 1132(a) does not preempt the field of permissible remedies
for an injured employee. Rather, an employee whose lawsuit falls within ERISA’s
saving clause’s scope should be able to obtain compensatory and punitive damages. This
article is dedicated to proving the accuracy of that conclusion.
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specialist. The HMO cited case law establishing that you are not entitled
to compensatory and punitive damages because such damages are not
allowable under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.2
While researching your response to the motion, you and your lawyer
discovered a state statute providing the following:
(1) Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the
timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary
care physician, who is unaffiliated with the [HMO], jointly selected by the
patient . . ., primary care physician and the [HMO] in the event of a dispute
between the primary care physician and the [HMO] regarding the medical
necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary care physician. In the
event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be
medically necessary, the [HMO] shall provide the covered service.3
(2) An HMO which does not inform its enrollees that they have the right to an
independent external review as provided in subpart 1 above shall be liable for
any compensatory damages that an enrollee suffers from being denied an
external review.

Therefore, the lawyer amended your complaint to add a state statutory
cause of action for the HMO’s failure to inform you that you had a right
to an independent external review of the HMO’s denial of your primary
care physician’s request for a referral to the specialist. In response, the
HMO’s lawyers amended the HMO’s motion for summary judgment to
allege that ERISA preempts the state statutory claim because § 1132(a)
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions provides the only cause of
action for the alleged improper denial of the specialist, and that §
1132(a) does not provide for compensatory damages.4 The trial judge
granted the motion for summary judgment, accepting the HMO’s
arguments regarding the scope of § 1132(a) and its impact on your case.
The relevant federal circuit court of appeals affirmed. You are now
contemplating whether you should file a writ of certiorari seeking review
before the Supreme Court of the United States.
Your attorney tells you that several of ERISA’s statutory provisions
will influence the Court’s decision if it accepts the appeal. ERISA’s
preemption clause, § 1144(a), provides that certain provisions of ERISA
will “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
2. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) (asserting that one is
not entitled to compensatory damages under § 1132(a)). Throughout this Article,
references are made to § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions, instead of to
§ 502(a), which is frequently cited in court opinions instead of § 1132(a). However,
these two cites refer to the exact same ERISA statutory provision. See Pittman, supra
note 1, at 211.
3. Section one of this hypothetical statute is exactly the same as the Illinois
independent review statute that the Court, in Rush v. Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 361 (2002), upheld as not being preempted by § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions. Id. at 386–87.
4. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254–55; Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
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hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” affecting interstate
commerce. 5 ERISA’s saving clause, § 1144(b)(2)(A), states that
“[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”6 And, § 1132(a)
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions establishes, in part, that a
beneficiary of an employee benefit plan may bring a federal civil action
“to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan.”7
The attorney tells you that, given that your state law statutory claim
“relates to” your health plan,8 which is an ERISA protected plan, the
Court will reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit only if it
finds that ERISA’s saving clause prevents the lawsuit from being
preempted by § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. As
such, your appeal presents a case of first impression on an issue that is
tantamount to the last frontier of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. The
primary issue is whether Congress has the legislative authority, despite
the dictates of the Supremacy Clause, to enact a saving clause that
exempt state laws from preemption even when such laws directly
conflict with one of ERISA’s statutory provisions. A resolution of this
issue in the affirmative would continue the Court’s erosion of the scope
of ERISA’s preemption, and it would pay homage to the much needed
changes that have already occurred in this area of federal preemption.9
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Throughout this Article, the Author uses the
phrases “saving clause-protected state law” and “saving clause-protected law.” These
phrases mean that the state law regulates insurance under the terms of ERISA’s saving
clause by satisfying the two-prong test that the Court established in Kentucky Ass’n of
Health, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Under ERISA’s preemption clause, a state law “relate[s]
to” an ERISA plan if it has a “reference to” or a “connection with” an ERISA plan.
Larry J. Pittman, “Any Willing Provider” Laws and ERISA’s Saving Clause: A New
Solution For an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REV. 409, 427 n.83 (1997). A “connection
with” exists when a state law “chang[es] the structure or the administration of the plan.”
Id. As such, the hypothetical state statute (given that it imposes an independent external
review process upon an HMO’s benefit review procedures) changes the structure of an
ERISA plan, thereby establishing a “connection with” the plan that is sufficient enough
for ERISA to preempt the statute unless ERISA’s saving clause exempt the law from
preemption. See id.
9. See generally Pittman, supra note 1, at 237–68 (discussing cases that have
reduced the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause).
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Most of that change has involved the direction in which the Court has
taken its interpretation of the phrase “relate to” as contained in ERISA’s
express preemption clause. Changing course after approximately
twenty-five years of expansively interpreting the preemption clause, the
Court has moved from a very broad interpretation of “relate to,” as
announced in Pilot Life v. Dedeaux,10 to a more practical, case-by-case
evaluation that principally asks whether a disputed state law interferes
with ERISA’s purposes and objectives, as discussed in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co.11 If the state law does not interfere with such purposes then there
will be no ERISA preemption of the law. As such, the Court has
significantly narrowed the scope of ERISA’s preemption.12 And, the
shifting of interpretation from the broad to the narrow has led to a
plethora of state and federal court opinions that find no ERISA
preemption of various state statutes and common law theories that
regulate managed care organizations.13
In addition to the narrowing of the preemption clause’s scope, the
Court has broadened the parameters of ERISA’s saving clause, which
may mean that the saving clause will exempt more state laws from
ERISA’s preemption.14 This Article takes a closer look at the Court’s
recent pronouncements regarding the saving clause and makes several
assertions about the future path that the Court’s saving clause
jurisprudence should take. Primarily, this Article concludes that the
Court’s interpretation of the saving clause should be even broader than it
presently is, so much so that the saving clause, when applicable, should
preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. In other
10. 481 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1987).
11. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). As a first look, the Court will still apply the definition of
“relate to,” “reference to” or “connection with,” to see if it will “manifestly and clearly”
answer the interpretative question. See Pittman, supra note 1, at 224 n.87. If such an
analysis is insufficient, the Court will then evaluate the state law’s impact on ERISA’s
purposes and objectives, principally the preemption clause’s purpose of providing for
uniform regulation of ERISA plans. See id.
12. Principally, there are two purposes that underlie ERISA. First, the general
purpose of the statute is to create a statutory scheme that protects employees and other
beneficiaries from an employer’s or other benefit plan manager’s fraud and abuse in
managing an employee benefit plan. See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause
and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46
FLA. L. REV. 355, 357–61 (1994). Second, the purpose of ERISA’s preemption clause is
to create a national uniformity of the regulation of ERISA benefit plans such that an
interstate plan will be able to operate under one set of rules and regulations without the
financial cost or other inefficiencies that would result from different regulations by
different states. See id.
13. See Pittman, supra note 1, at 237–68 (analyzing lawsuits and theories that
escape preemption under the Court’s new approach to ERISA’s preemption).
14. See infra notes 16–26 and accompanying text.
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words, the arguments that appear below establish that the Court should
reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the above-referenced hypothetical
lawsuit.
Part II discusses the Court’s most recent opinion interpreting ERISA’s
saving clause and it explains some of the possible implications flowing
from that opinion. Part III shows how indecisive the Court has been
when interpreting the saving clause, and it emphasizes how the Court
has gone from a very broad to a more narrow interpretation of the clause.
Part IV asserts that the Court should apply a plain meaning interpretation
of the saving clause, one that extends the clause’s application to the
fullest extent of the Congressional intent that underlie the clause. Lastly,
Part V concludes that the Court should not be concerned that a broad,
plain meaning interpretation of the saving clause might lead to some
state laws preempting such ERISA statutory provisions as § 1132(a) of
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions, and that, if such destruction were
to occur, it would be in furtherance of Congress’ intent that states should
have broad authority when regulating insurance.
II. A SAVING CLAUSE PROGRESSION TOWARDS MORE FEDERALISM
ERISA’s saving clause states: “Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities.”15 The Court’s most recent decision interpreting
ERISA’s saving clause shows that the Court may be moving towards a
more expansive interpretation. In Kentucky Ass’n of Health, Inc. v.
Miller,16 the Court held that the saving clause exempted Kentucky’s
“Any Willing Provider” (AWP) law from ERISA’s preemption.17
Arguably, this decision enlarges the scope of ERISA’s saving clause,
and it should lead to more state laws being exempted from preemption.
The expansion of the saving clause’s scope is evidenced by the Court’s
adoption of a new two-prong test for determining when a state law is
exempted from preemption: (1) “the state law must be specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance,” and (2) “the state law
must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the

15.
16.
17.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
538 U.S. 329 (2003).
See id. at 335–36.
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insurer and the insured.”18
Analytically, courts should not encounter much difficulty when
applying the first prong.19 But, the second prong—“substantially affect
the risk pooling arrangement”—is more challenging. First, in Miller, the
Court abandoned the use of the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s (MFA) threefactor analysis because ERISA’s saving clause’s language requires only
that a state law “regulates insurance,” and not that the law regulates a
practice that is a part of “the business of insurance,” as required by the
MFA.20
This distinction, between the language of the saving clause and the
language of the MFA, arguably expands the types of laws that ERISA’s
saving clause will protect from preemption. One category of protected
laws consists of laws that impose preconditions on insurance companies’
and other risk-bearing entities’ permission to conduct business within a
state. AWP laws fall within that category; and therefore, they escape
ERISA’s preemption, under the Miller Court’s rationale.
By expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive
health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between
insurers and insureds in a manner similar to the mandated-benefit laws we
upheld in Metropolitan Life, the notice-prejudice rule we sustained in UNUM,
and the independent-review provisions we approved in Rush Prudential. No
longer may Kentucky insureds seek insurance from a closed network of healthcare providers in exchange for a lower premium. The AWP prohibition
substantially affects the type of risk pooling arrangements that insurers may
offer.21

18. Id. at 1479. Prior to Miller, the Court interpreted ERISA’s saving clause by
applying both a “common sense” understanding of “regulates insurance” and the threefactor analysis under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: (1) “‘whether the practice has the
effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk’”; (2) “‘whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured’”; and (3)
“‘whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.’” Pittman,
supra note 8, at 440–41. Given that the first and second factors of the three-factor
analysis are no longer a part of an ERISA’s saving clause analysis, there is reason to
believe that Miller’s new interpretation of the saving clause will exempt more laws from
ERISA’s preemption.
19. The first prong has been a part of an ERISA’s saving clause analysis for more
than a decade and therefore courts have developed some expertise in its application. See
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (asserting that, to regulate insurance, a state law “must be
specifically directed toward that industry”). See also Pittman, supra note 8, at 442–47
(discussing cases that apply the first prong).
20. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339–40. Apparently, the Court’s older cases incorporated
the MFA’s three-factor analysis into an ERISA saving clause analysis because both the
saving clause and the MFA appear to have the same purpose of granting states regulatory
control over the insurance industry. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and
Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 100 (1993).
21. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338-39 (citations omitted). However, there are some
preconditions that will not “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement” between
the insured and insurer. For example, in Miller, the Court referenced that ERISA’s
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The gist of the above-quoted statement is that a state law’s preconditions
or other obligations, such as an AWP law, must have a substantial
impact on insurers’ and insureds’ abilities to negotiate for different types
of insurance arrangements than the one that the state law mandates.
However, beyond this broad statement, the scope of the “substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement” requirement is not clear; and, the
Court must clarify that requirement on a case-by-case basis during future
litigation.22
But, a second category of state laws, those that mandate the terms and
conditions of insurance arrangements, should easily meet the
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement” test. Like the AWP
law at issue in Miller, mandated-benefit laws limit the types of policies
and contracts that insurers can offer to their insureds. Consistent with
the Court’s prior opinion, these types of laws should continue their
preemption-exempt status under Miller’s new two-prong test.23
A third category of state laws that will normally satisfy the
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement” requirement includes
those laws that impose utilization review requirements, that establish
external review obligations (like the above-referenced hypothetical
statute), that mandate other procedures and conditions on the types of
benefits that insurers must offer the insured, and that regulate the manner
in which insurers must provide medical benefits.24
saving clause would not exempt a hypothetical state law mandating that insurance
companies pay their “janitors twice the minimum wage” because such a law would not
have the requisite effect on the insured-insurer relationship. Id. at 338. But, the Court’s
opinion regarding minimum wages lends itself to exceptions. One could argue that, if in
exchange for having to pay such wages, the insurer raises its premiums and changes the
terms and conditions of its policies (by dropping certain coverage), even a minimum
wage law might have a substantial impact on the risk pooling arrangement. Therefore,
generalization about the types of laws that the saving clause will protect are not helpful.
Instead, a case-by-case evaluation of a disputed state law’s terms and conditions and the
effects thereof on the insured-insurer’s relationship is necessary to determine whether the
saving clause exempts a state law for ERISA’s preemption.
22. It seems that the “substantially affect” language is somewhat vague.
Therefore, it is possible that, as with an ERISA’s preemption clause analysis, the Court
might find that some state laws’ effect on the insured-insurer’s relation is “too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
23. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding
that ERISA’s saving clause exempted a state’s mandated benefit law from ERISA’s
preemption).
24. It seems that state laws falling within the scope of the third category of laws
will satisfy the second prong of the Miller test because they limit the types of insurance
arrangements into which insurers and insureds can enter. See supra text accompanying
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It appears that state laws that fall within the third category, similar to
mandated-benefit laws, dictate the terms and conditions that insurers and
the insured must include within their contractual arrangements. These
types of laws normally have a substantial effect on insurance contracts
and other risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.
Such effects might even impose substantial operating costs on insurers,
including the costs of disputed medical benefits in states that have
binding independent review requirements.25
Given that at least section one of the above-referenced hypothetical
state statute falls within the third category of saving clause-protected
laws, ERISA’s saving clause will exempt section one from preemption.
For example, in Rush v. Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,26 the Court
held that ERISA’s saving clause exempted from preemption the same
type of binding independent external review requirement.27
However, neither Rush nor Miller is dispositive on whether section
two of the hypothetical state statute can grant compensatory damages
when § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions does not allow
such damages. At best, the real benefit of Miller might be that it shows
that the Court can expansively interpret ERISA’s saving clause and can
abandon old analytical tests like the MFA’s three-factor analysis.
note 18.
25. In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002), the Court stated
the following regarding the increase in operating cost that an HMO might suffer from
being subjected to the state’s binding independent review procedures:
And although the added compliance cost to the HMO may ultimately be passed
on to the ERISA plan, we have said that such “indirect economic effects,” are
not enough to preempt state regulation even outside of the insurance context.
We recognize, of course, that a State might enact an independent review
requirement with procedures so elaborate, and burdens so onerous, that they
might undermine §1132(a). No such system is before us.
Id. at 381 n.11 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659 (1995)).
In addition to the added costs of having to institute procedures consistent with a state’s
binding independent review procedures—costs that an HMO directly bears, and that
ERISA plans indirectly bear when the HMO shifts the cost to the plans—binding
external reviews have the potential of shifting the final decisions on who bears the risk of
loss from the insurer to an external reviewer who may be more receptive to the insureds’
claims for benefits because the external reviewer will not normally have the same
conflict of interest that insurers generally have. This shifting of the decisions on who
bears the risk of loss might ultimately take benefits out of the plan that would remain in
the plan under a system without independent external review.
At the end of the day, the Rush majority did not find that either the costs of instituting
a binding independent review procedure, or the ultimate cost of the risk of loss when an
external reviewer reverses an HMO’s benefit decision, warranted a conclusion that
ERISA’s saving clause did not exempt the state law at issue in Rush because of an
alleged conflict with the purposes of § 1132(a). Id. at 386–87.
26. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
27. See id. at 387.
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Additionally, Miller can serve as a good springboard from which the
Court will start interpreting ERISA’s saving clause as broadly as
Congress intended. Along these lines, the Court should give ERISA’s
saving clause an interpretation that is even broader than Miller. More
specifically, the Court should recognize and enforce Congress’ intent
that states should have the authority under ERISA’s saving clause to
grant remedies to the insured that are inconsistent with § 1132(a) of
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.
Such recognition has much implication for the above-referenced
hypothetical lawsuit. First, Rush is precedent that ERISA’s saving
clause would protect section one of the hypothetical state statute from
ERISA’s preemption. But, given that Rush did not involve a provision
like section two of the hypothetical statute, it is not sufficient authority
that section two escapes preemption. Therefore, one must review other
relevant cases to see whether they resolve the ultimate issue of whether a
state law can successfully provide compensatory and punitive damages
that conflict with § 1132(a), a section that does not provide for such
remedies.
However, a brief analysis of the Court’s saving clause jurisprudence
shows that the Court has not been consistent in its interpretation of the
clause—alternating between a broad and a narrow interpretation. This
analysis reveals that the Court appears more likely to give a narrow
interpretation of the saving clause when there is a conflict between a
state law and § 1132(a), as section two of the hypothetical state statute
presents. The Court’s predisposition is primarily based upon the Court’s
mistaken belief about the scope and the application of the Supremacy
Clause.28
III. THE COURT’S INDECISIVENESS OVER THE SCOPE OF ERISA’S
SAVING CLAUSE
A. A Broad Interpretation
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,29 the Court, for
28. Harris Trust, 510 U.S. at 98 (“ERISA leaves room for complementary or dual
federal and state regulation, and calls for federal supremacy when the two regimes
cannot be harmonized or accommodated.”); see also Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at
377 (asserting, in dictum, that when a conflict arises between a saving clause-protected
state law and § 1132(a) remedies, the state law “los[es] out”).
29. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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the first time, engaged in a substantive analysis of ERISA’s saving
clause—one that was outcome determinant.30 The Court held that
ERISA’s saving clause exempted from preemption a Massachusetts state
law mandating that insurance companies provide “specified minimum
mental-health-care benefits” to their insured.31 The Court held that the
saving clause was applicable because the state law “regulate[d] the terms
of certain insurance contracts,” thereby meeting the “common-sense
view” of an insurance regulation.32 Significantly, the Metropolitan Life
Court opposed a narrow reading of the saving clause when it rejected an
argument that the saving clause is applicable only when a state law does
not conflict with one of ERISA’s substantive provisions.33 Instead, the
Court used a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause, and
of ERISA’s deemer clause, to support its opinion that there were no
limitations on the saving clause other than the deemer clause and the
saving clause’s own language.34 As such, Metropolitan Life’s broad
interpretation of the saving clause supports an argument that a saving
clause-protected state law trumps even inconsistent ERISA substantive
provisions.35
Subsequently, the Court continued its broad interpretation of the
saving clause in FMC Corp. v. Holliday36 in which the Court held that
30. See id. at 739–47.
31. See id. at 727, 744.
32. Id. at 740.
33. See id. at 746–47. In Metropolitan Life, the Court rejected the lower court’s
contention that the saving clause “save[s] only state regulation unrelated to the
substantive provisions of ERISA”; or that it is applicable only when a state law “directly
regulate[s] the insurer,” or when it regulates such “matters as the way in which insurance
may be sold.” Id. at 746–47, 741.
34. See id. at 746. The Court stated:
We therefore decline to impose any limitation on the saving clause beyond
those Congress imposed in the clause itself and in the “deemer clause” which
modifies it. If a state law “regulates insurance,” as mandated-benefit laws do,
it is not preempted. Nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history
of the Act supports a more narrow reading of the clause, whether it be the
Supreme Judicial Court’s attempt to save only state regulations unrelated to
the substantive provisions of ERISA, or the insurers’ more speculative attempt
to read the saving clause out of the statute.
Id. at 746–47 (emphasis added). This quote from Metropolitan Life directly addresses
the conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state law. In effect, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that the saving clause would not protect
a state law that conflicts with one of ERISA’s substantive provisions, which includes §
1132(a). See id. However, the majority opinion in Metropolitan Life did not accept such
a limitation. See id. In other words, the Court, by implication, held that the saving
clause, when applicable, being limited only by its language and the deemer clause,
exempts state laws from preemption even when they conflict with one of ERISA’s
substantive provisions, such as § 1132(a).
35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
deemer clause, see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
36. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
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ERISA’s saving clause would have saved a Pennsylvania antisubrogation law had the ERISA plan not been self-insured.37 Although
not specifically addressing whether the anti-subrogation law conflicted
with § 1132(a), the Holliday Court stated that the only limitation on the
application of ERISA’s saving clause is ERISA’s deemer clause.38 The
Court stated: “Unless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving
clause by virtue of the deemer clause, therefore, it is not pre-empted.”39
The Court further reasoned that “the saving and deemer clauses employ
differing language to achieve their ends—the former saving, except as
provided in the deemer clause, ‘any law of any State which regulates
insurance.’”40
A fair reading of these statements from Holliday supports a conclusion
that ERISA’s saving clause’s preemptive effects are such that a state
law, which is within the coverage of the saving clause, preempts ERISA’s
own statutory provisions given that ERISA’s deemer clause is the only
limitation on the scope of the saving clause. That conclusion is
consistent with the Court’s opinion in Metropolitan Life,41 and it means
that § 1132(a) is not a limitation that would prevent a saving clauseprotected law from imposing remedies that are different than those
contained in § 1132(a). However, the Court soon found a way to
backtrack from Metropolitan Life’s and Holliday’s broad interpretation
of the saving clause.
B. A Narrow Interpretation
In addition to Pilot Life’s holding that ERISA’s saving clause did not
exempt Mississippi’s bad faith law from preemption,42 the Court’s
dictum implied that one cannot use the saving clause to exempt a saving
clause-protected law from preemption if the law conflicts with § 1132(a)
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.43 As such, the Court held that
ERISA’s saving clause did not save the bad faith lawsuit from
preemption because the lawsuit sought compensatory and punitive
37. Id. at 61–62. The state law prohibited insurance companies and health plans
from obtaining subrogation of funds that ERISA beneficiaries obtain from third-party
tortfeasors. Id. at 55.
38. Id. at 61.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
43. See id. at 52–57.
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damages that are not allowable under § 1132(a).44 Primarily, the Court
used field preemption to assert that § 1132(a)’s remedies are the
exclusive remedies for an alleged “improper processing” of a request for
benefits under an ERISA plan.45
One can argue that Pilot Life’s narrowing of the scope of ERISA’s
saving clause is inconsistent with Metropolitan Life and Holliday. In
other words, Pilot Life asserted that § 1132(a) is a limitation on the
scope of a state law that falls within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause,
while Metropolitan Life and Holliday stated that the deemer clause is the
only limitation on a saving clause-protected law. Subsequently, the
Court has indicated that it might follow Pilot Life’s narrow interpretation.
For example, in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris
Trust and Savings Bank,46 a case of first impression, the Court
considered the legal effects of a direct conflict between a saving clauseprotected state law and one of ERISA’s statutory provisions.47 At issue
was a state law mandating that an insurance company manage its general
accounts by considering “‘the interests of all of its contractholders,
creditors and shareholders,’ [and that it] ‘maintain equity among its
various constituencies.’”48 This state law conflicted with an ERISA
fiduciary provision that requires that an ERISA fiduciary manage a plan
44. Id. at 54. The Pilot Life Court stated:
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, . . . this Court rejected an
interpretation of the saving clause of ERISA’s express pre-emption provisions,
§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), that saved from pre-emption “only
state regulations unrelated to the substantive provisions of ERISA,” finding
that “[n]othing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act”
supported this reading of the saving clause. Metropolitan Life, however, did
not involve a state law that conflicted with a substantive provision of ERISA.
Therefore the Court’s general observation—that state laws related to ERISA
may also fall under the saving clause—was not focused on any particular
relationship or conflict between a substantive provision of ERISA and a state
law. In particular, the Court had no occasion to consider in Metropolitan Life
the question raised in the present case: whether Congress might clearly
express, through the structure and legislative history of a particular substantive
provision of ERISA, an intention that the federal remedy provided by that
provision displace state causes of action. Our resolution of this different
question does not conflict with the Court’s earlier general observations in
Metropolitan Life.
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56–57.
45. Field preemption occurs when “the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it.’” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
46. 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
47. Id. at 97–98.
48. Id. at 97 (quoting Steven H. Goldberg & Melvin S. Altman, The Case for the
Nonapplication of ERISA to Insurers’ General Account Assets, TORT & INS. L.J. 475, 477
(1986)).
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“‘solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for
the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries.’”49 Following the rationale of Metropolitan Life and
Holliday, the Court could have held that the state law preempted
ERISA’s fiduciary obligation because the law fell within the scope of
ERISA’s saving clause and because it did not run afoul of ERISA’s
deemer clause.50
Instead, the Court held that ERISA envisioned a dual regulation of the
business of insurance by states and the federal government through
ERISA’s statutory provisions.51 The Court asserted that, in this zone of
dual regulation, normal rules of federal preemption apply such that
federal regulations will preempt state regulations when the state “law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. . . .”52 To support this conclusion, the Court
relied upon language from the district court’s opinion, asserting that “we
discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed
ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption analysis.”53
Therefore, finding a conflict between the state law regulation of an
insurer’s general account funds and ERISA’s fiduciary obligations
regarding such accounts, the Court held that ERISA’s fiduciary
obligations preempted the state regulations, and that these fiduciary
obligations were applicable to issues involving John Hancock’s
management of the general account.54
Although at first blush Harris Trust appears to be a straightforward
application of the Supremacy Clause, a more exacting analysis shows
that the Court made a mistake when it concluded that there was no
evidence that Congress had an intent “to alter traditional preemption
analysis.”55 Justice Ginsburg, the author of the majority opinion in
Harris Trust, did not do a very thorough analysis of Congress’ intent
regarding the legal effects of a conflict between a saving clauseprotected state law and one of ERISA’s statutory provisions. For
example, instead of relying upon a plain meaning statutory interpretation
and the canons of statutory construction that are supportive of such an
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).
See supra text accompanying notes 29–40.
Harris Trust, 510 U.S. at 98.
Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id. at 101.
Id. at 99.
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interpretation, Justice Ginsburg applied an opposing rule: “To answer that
question, we examine first the language of the governing statute, guided
not by ‘a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”56 Curiously,
this quote is from Pilot Life, wherein the Court, instead of specifically
examining ERISA’s saving clause’s and preemption clause’s statutory
language, analyzed ERISA’s legislative scheme and the alleged purpose
of § 1132(a). The Pilot Life Court concluded that a broad interpretation
of the saving clause (to save Mississippi’s bad faith law from
preemption) would be inconsistent with the goal of § 1132(a) providing
the exclusive remedies for violations within the scope of § 1132(a),
including claims against an ERISA plan for alleged improper processing
of requests for benefits.57
But, in relying upon Pilot Life’s dictum regarding the exclusivity of §
1132(a), Justice Ginsburg jumped the gun too quickly.58 She went too
rapidly to a reconciliation of the various purposes of ERISA’s saving
clause, of the MFA, and of field preemption.59 Before beginning her
analysis of ERISA’s statutory purposes, Justice Ginsburg should have
paid closer attention to ERISA’s statutory language and to several rules
of statutory interpretation that were in existence when the Court decided
56. Id. at 94–95 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987))
(alteration in original). Although other court cases, in addition to reviewing the explicit
language of a preemption clause, have examined the “‘structure and purpose of the
statute as a whole,’ as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s
reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its
surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law,” Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)), such an analysis, even when used to achieve a result that
is different from the plain meaning interpretation as discussed in this Article, will not
resolve the issue of whether Congress intended that a saving clause-protected law can
preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. This is because neither
ERISA’s legislative history, nor anything else that Congress has said about the scope of
§ 1132(a), or about ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, even remotely
warrants the conclusion that Congress intended that § 1132(a) preempt a saving clauseprotected law. Furthermore, to the extent that the Court is committed to the rule that
there must be a “clear and manifest” showing that Congress intended to preempt a state
law “historic police powers” regulation, Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 471, then the Court
should be more willing to apply a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption
clause and saving clause because neither ERISA’s statutory language nor its legislative
history shows that Congress had a “clear and manifest” intent that § 1132(a) preempts a
state law insurance regulation that provides for remedies that are different from those
contained in § 1132(a). Rather, given the clear plain meaning language of the
preemption clause and saving clause, the only logical conclusion is that Congress clearly
and manifestly intended that a saving clause-protected state law preempt § 1132(a), even
when such a law provides different remedies.
57. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52–57 (1987).
58. Harris Trust, 510 U.S. at 94–95.
59. See id. at 97–101.
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Harris Trust. These rules of construction are: (1) “‘[t]he question
whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of
congressional intent’”;60 (2) “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone’”61 of statutory interpretation; (3) the unambiguous text of a
statute is the primary source from which the Court will garner
Congressional intent because “vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic
purpose’ are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text
regarding the specific issue under consideration”;62 and (4) when
interpreting the language of an express preemption clause and an express
saving clause, the Court “need not go beyond that language to determine
whether Congress intended” that state law be preempted.63
60. Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (1992) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 208 (1985)).
61. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504,
516 (1992)).
62. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993).
63. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484. In Medtronic, the Court stated:
[W]e are presented with the task of interpreting a statutory provision that
expressly pre-empts state law. While the pre-emptive language of § 360k(a)
means that we need not go beyond that language to determine whether
Congress intended the MDA [Medical Device Amendment] to pre-empt at
least some state law, we must nonetheless “identify the domain expressly preempted” by the language.
Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
It should also be noted that the Court also stated:
Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the
pre-emption statute and the “statutory framework” surrounding it. [Gade, 505
U.S. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring)]. Also relevant, however, is the “structure and
purpose of the statute as a whole,” as revealed not only in the text, but through
the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress
intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business,
consumers, and the law.
Id. at 486 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 98). The only way that the Court can justify a
refusal to use a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving
clause is to somehow rely upon this statement from Medtronic to allege that allowing a
saving clause-protected state law to provide an alternative cause of action and remedies
would be inconsistent with the “statutory framework” underlying § 1132(a)’s civil
enforcement remedies. Id. This seems to be the legal import of the Pilot Life Court’s
inference that § 1132(a) prohibits a state from offering remedies that are different than
those provided in § 1132(a). Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
But, such a rationale is not persuasive because it undermines states’ abilities to regulate
insurance and because it cuts against the Court’s own canon of interpretation that
Congress is presumed to intend the interpretation that stems from a statute’s plain
language. Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (regarding the
interpretation of a statute that did not involve a saving clause, the Court stated that “[t]he
first step ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case’”) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
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Given these rules of statutory interpretation, the Harris Trust Court
should have first determined whether the language of ERISA’s
preemption clause and saving clause is unambiguous. The Court’s
failure to perform such an evaluation is even more questionable given
subsequent cases that the Court has decided. For example, in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,64 a post Harris Trust decision, the Court
recently reaffirmed that, when the statutory text is clear, there is no need
to refer to, or rely upon, legislative history when interpreting a statute.65
Consistently, in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,66 the Court stated: “We
have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is
also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”67
These rules of construction for unambiguous statutes are applicable to
an interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause, ERISA’s preemption clause,
and to an inquiry regarding a saving clause-protected state law’s ability
to preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. In the
final analysis, because of the Harris Trust Court’s failure to conduct a
thorough analysis of the language of ERISA’s preemption clause and
saving clause, and to follow its own rules of statutory interpretation,
Harris Trust should have little or no precedential value on whether a
saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions.
In asserting that the Court should apply a plain meaning interpretation
of ERISA’s saving clause and ERISA’s preemption clause to determine
the supremacy of a saving clause-protected state law, this Author does
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
64. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
65. Id. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we
need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision.”).
66. 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
67. Id. at 461–62 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
Some might argue that courts should not apply a plain meaning interpretation of an
unambiguous statute when the statute “contain[s] conflicting provisions.” Id. at 461. To
support such an argument, one might further state that ERISA’s saving clause itself (or a
saving clause-protected state law that imposes remedies different from those stated in §
1132(a)) conflicts with § 1132(a). And, therefore, courts should not limit themselves
only to a review of the language of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause.
However, such arguments have no merit because a saving clause-protected state law,
even if it imposes remedies that are different from § 1132(a)’s remedies, does not
conflict with § 1132(a) because § 1132(a) does not apply when a state law falls within
the scope of ERISA’s saving clause. In such cases, § 1132(a) does not apply because the
controlling law is the exempted saving clause-protected state law. Therefore, courts
should continue to apply a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause
and saving clause at least when determining the nature of the state laws that ERISA’s
saving clause exempts from preemption.
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not mean to imply that the Court should never disregard a plain meaning
interpretation of a saving clause and a preemption clause. However, to
do so, at a minimum the Court should justify such action by showing
that the plain meaning language of either a preemption clause or a saving
clause clearly conflicts with another statutory provision (or with clear
and undisputable legislative history) that conclusively shows that
Congress’ intent is different than that expressed in the plain meaning
language. Using other statutory provisions and legislative history to
disregard the plain meaning language of a preemption clause and saving
clause arguably is one of the rationales that underlie the Court’s prior
observations that the Court will sometimes go beyond the language of a
statute, including a preemption clause and a saving clause, and look at
the “‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as revealed not only in
the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the
way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding
regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.”68
However, even when one acknowledges that sometimes it is permissible
for the Court to go beyond a plain meaning interpretation and look at the
“structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,” such an approach will
not resolve the issue whether a saving clause-protected state law can
preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.69 This is
because neither § 1132(a), nor any of ERISA’s scant legislative history,
clearly and manifestly shows that Congress intended that § 1132(a)
preempt a saving clause-protected state law. Rather, given that Congress
apparently drafted ERISA’s saving clause to ensure that states have the
authority to regulate insurance, as provided for in the MFA, the best
conclusion is that a state insurance regulation, even when it provides
different remedies than those provided in § 1132(a), presumptively trumps
§ 1132(a). This is especially true given that both ERISA’s preemption clause
and ERISA’s saving clause more clearly provide for a saving clause
protected state law’s preemption of § 1132(a) than do other statutory
provisions of ERISA, or any legislative history references, provide for §
1132(a)’s preemption of a saving clause-protected state law.

68.
69.

Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 98).
Id.
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IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPLY A PLAIN MEANING INTERPRETATION
OF ERISA’S PREEMPTION AND SAVING CLAUSES
The Court in Harris Trust, being aware that it had previously stated in
other opinions that it would interpret a statute according to its clear and
unambiguous language, should have either followed a plain meaning
statutory interpretation,70 or it should have given some reasonable
explanation for not doing so. Instead, the majority opinion, in adopting
the lower court’s assertion, simply stated: “In accord with the District
Court in this case, however, we discern no solid basis for believing that
Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter
traditional preemption analysis.”71
Such an assertion is inadequate and unjustified because ERISA’s
preemption clause clearly and unambiguously shows that Congress did
intend to change “traditional preemption analysis.”72 ERISA’s preemption
clause clearly provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title.73

An honest plain meaning deconstruction of the preemption clause is
instructive regarding its scope. The “first phrase” of ERISA’s preemption
clause—“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section”—is an
exception to the “second phrase”—“the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefits
plan . . . .”74 The second phrase is the operative language of ERISA’s
preemption clause. The first phrase refers to ERISA’s saving clause,
contained in subsection (b). When one reads the second phrase and the
first phrase together, these phrases provide that ERISA’s preemption
clause will preempt any state law that “relate[s] to” an ERISA plan
unless ERISA’s saving clause saves the state law from preemption.75
Furthermore, the only limitation on the saving clause is ERISA’s deemer
70. Instead of examining the specific language of ERISA’s preemption clause and
saving clause, the Harris Trust Court engaged in an analysis of the Supremacy Clause’s
impact when a saving clause-protected state law has provisions that are different than
one of ERISA’s substantive provisions. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust & Savs. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 97–101 (1993).
71. Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
72. Id.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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clause, which prevents state laws from deeming ERISA plans to be
insurance companies for the purpose of regulating them under ERISA’s
saving clause.76
A further deconstruction of ERISA’s preemption clause’s language
shows that a saving clause-protected state law escapes ERISA’s
preemption even when the state law conflicts with one of ERISA’s
substantive provisions. For example, when the preemption clause’s
language speaks of preemption of state laws, it does so regarding certain
“provisions of this subchapter” superseding state laws.77 Importantly,
the “provisions of this subchapter” language refers to Subchapter I of
ERISA, which includes ERISA’s “fiduciary responsibility” provisions in
§§ 1101–1114 and ERISA’s “administration and enforcement”
provisions in §§ 1131–1147, which includes § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions.78
When the second phrase of ERISA’s preemption clause is read in
conjunction with the first phrase, the meaning of ERISA’s preemption
clause is that certain sections of ERISA will preempt state laws except
when such state laws regulate insurance under ERISA’s saving clause.79
More specifically, it means that ERISA’s fiduciary provisions (as at
issue in Harris Trust) and ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions (such
as § 1132(a)) will preempt state laws except when such state laws
regulate insurance within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause. It should
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000). See Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 746 (1985) (“We therefore decline to impose any limitation on the saving
clause beyond those Congress imposed in the clause itself and in the ‘deemer clause’
which modifies it.”); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (stating
that the only way a state law can be excluded from the saving clause is by the deemer
clause). ERISA’s deemer clause is an exception to the saving clause, in that the saving
clause does not apply if the deemer clause is applicable. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 733.
The Court has interpreted the deemer clause to mean that, pursuant to ERISA’s saving
clause, states can regulate the “business of insurance,” except that states cannot deem an
ERISA plan itself “to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in
the business of insurance . . . for the purpose of any State law purporting to regulate
insurance companies . . . .” Id. In other words, when the deemer clause is interpreted
consistently with the saving clause, states can regulate insurance companies that supply
insurance policies to ERISA plans, including the terms of those insurance policies and
the other incidents of the “business of insurance,” but states cannot either directly
regulate ERISA plans themselves, or regulate self-funded ERISA plans. See id.
77. See supra text accompanying note 73.
78. For a review of the ERISA statutory provisions that are contained within this
subchapter, which is subchapter I of ERISA, see the table of contents that precedes
ERISA’s statutory provisions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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be clearly noted that because ERISA’s preemption clause is an express
preemption clause, express preemption applies, instead of conflict
preemption or field preemption.80 In other words, the statutory language
of ERISA’s express preemption clause is outcome determinant, pursuant
to the Court’s own rules of statutory construction: “We [the Court] have
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the
last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”81
Given the Court’s own canon of statutory interpretation, one can make
a cogent argument that the Court erroneously decided Harris Trust. This
is because ERISA’s preemption clause, being an express preemption
clause, expressly provides that ERISA’s fiduciary standards (being one
of “the provisions of this subchapter”) do not supersede or preempt a
state law regulation of insurance, such as the law at issue in Harris
Trust.82
This same general conclusion applies to Pilot Life’s speculation that §
1132(a) would preempt an inconsistent state law insurance regulation.
In other words, § 1132(a) does not preempt a state law regulation that
satisfies the saving clause test because ERISA’s express preemption
clause provides that the civil enforcement provisions (being one of the
“provisions of this subchapter”) do not supersede or preempt a state law
that falls within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.83
Fortunately, in most of its ERISA preemption cases, the Court has not
confronted a situation where an argument is made that a specific section
of ERISA, such as § 1132(a), preempts a state law that regulates
insurance under the saving clause’s protection.84 The main thrust in
many of the Court’s prior cases is that the relevant state law, despite not
conflicting with one of ERISA’s substantive provisions, stands as an
obstacle to ERISA’s preemption clause’s purpose of providing for a

80. The Harris Trust Court erroneously reasoned that field preemption applies
when a saving clause-protected state law conflicts with one of ERISA’s substantive
provisions. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86,
99 (1993) (asserting that “‘where [that] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ federal preemption occurs”) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (alteration in original)).
Instead of field preemption, express preemption principles apply when there is an
express preemption clause. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (citation
omitted).
81. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 (2002) (quoting Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
82. See supra text accompanying note 73.
83. Id.
84. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377 (2002).
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uniformity of regulation of ERISA welfare benefit plans.85 In some of
those cases, the Court has held that a state law that has the potential of
creating disuniformity “relates to” an ERISA plan and is therefore
preempted unless ERISA’s saving clause exempts the law from
preemption.86 But, now the real divide for ERISA’s saving clause
jurisprudence is whether the Court will interpret ERISA’s saving clause
such that a saving clause-protected state law will actually preempt a
conflicting ERISA statutory provision. The main theme of this Article is
that ERISA’s preemption clause’s language, as analyzed above, establishes
that a saving clause-protected state law does preempt inconsistent
ERISA statutory provisions contained in subchapter I, including ERISA’s
fiduciary provisions and § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement
provisions.
However, in its last pronouncement on the issue of § 1132(a)’s
preemptive effects, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,87 the Court
stated its support for Pilot Life’s reference that § 1132(a) preempts a
state law that is within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause if the law
creates “alternative causes of action and alternative remedies.”88 But,
because the Court’s decision in Rush did not involve a conflict between
§ 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state law, Rush’s discussion is
mere dictum.89 That dictum provides:

85. See generally Pittman, supra note 1, at 237–68 (discussing cases that interpret
ERISA’s preemption clause); Pittman, supra note 12, at 393 (same).
86. See Pittman, supra note 1, at 246–48.
87. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
88. Id. at 381.
89. See id. at 386 (holding that the binding independent review law “imposes no
new obligation or remedy like the causes of action considered in Russell, Pilot Life, and
Ingersoll-Rand”).
Having tacitly accepted Pilot Life’s dicta, and concluded that the state law fell within
the scope of ERISA’s saving clause, see id. at 375, the Rush Court reasoned that there
was no conflict with § 1132(a) because the relevant binding independent review
provision of the state law did not create either an alternative cause of action or an
alternative remedy to those provided in § 1132(a). See id. at 386. The Court reached
this conclusion despite the fact that the state law made the independent reviewer’s
decision binding on the HMO. See id. at 379–80. Apparently, in the Court’s opinion,
the reason why the law did not create an alternative cause of action or alternative remedy
is that a beneficiary, complaining about denied benefits, would still have to file a civil
enforcement claim under § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement provisions, and that beneficiary
would still be seeking only denied benefits, which is the only monetary remedy
allowable under § 1132(a), and not compensatory or punitive damages.
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Although we have yet to encounter a forced choice between the congressional
policies of exclusively federal remedies and the “reservation of the business of
insurance to the States,” [Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
744 n.21 (1985)], we have anticipated such a conflict, with the state insurance
regulation losing out if it allows plan participants “to obtain remedies . . . that
Congress rejected in ERISA.”90

Several observations about the above-quoted statement, which shows
that the Court is leaning toward a definitive holding that § 1132(a)
would trump a saving clause-protected state law, are instructive. First,
to support its dictum, the Court relied upon three of its prior cases.
However, the Court correctly noted that these three cases did not involve
a direct conflict between ERISA’s statutory provisions and a saving
clause-protected state law.91 For example, in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell,92 the Court simply referred to the extensiveness
of § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement provisions as evidence that the Court
should not imply a private right of action under ERISA for compensatory
and punitive damages.93 That case did not involve a saving clause-protected
state law; as such, Russell is really not applicable to a situation where
there is a conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state
law. Unless, of course, one wants to incorporate Russell’s broad statements
about § 1132(a)’s exclusiveness into an analysis involving such a
conflict, instead of applying the clear and unambiguous language of
ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, which provides that the
deemer clause is the only limitation on the scope of ERISA’s saving
clause.94
The thrust of this Article is that Russell should not be forced into an
analysis involving such a conflict because the Russell Court’s comments
about the exclusiveness of § 1132(a)’s remedies are nothing more than
the Court’s own policy arguments regarding Congress’ intent with
respect to the scope of permissible remedies under an ERISA plan. Such
policy arguments circumvent and cut against the Court’s own canon of
statutory interpretation that “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”95
Given that canon of interpretation, and the fact that ERISA’s preemption
clause’s language, in a plain meaning fashion, clearly and unambiguously
states that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions (such as § 1132(a)) do
90. Id. at 377 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
91. See id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21 (1985);
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54).
92. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
93. Id. at 147–48.
94. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 73–79.
95. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
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not preempt a saving clause-protected state law, the logical conclusion is
that, despite Russell’s conclusions regarding the extensiveness of §
1132(a), a saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) by
imposing different remedies, including compensatory and punitive
damages. Furthermore, another one of the Court’s cases, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,96 which contains language regarding the
exclusiveness of § 1132(a)’s remedies, does not destroy that conclusion.
In Taylor, the Court held that a beneficiary’s claim for an alleged
improper denial of disability benefits was removable to federal court
because § 1132(a) provides a cause of action for the same alleged
improper denial of benefits.97 However, the Taylor Court recognized
that the claim did not involve a saving clause-protected state law.98
Thus, there was no conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clauseprotected state law. Therefore, Taylor, which is a case about complete
preemption for removal jurisdiction purposes, is not relevant when a
saving clause-protected state law conflicts with § 1132(a).99
Likewise, the Court’s decision in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon100
did not involve a saving clause-protected state law’s direct conflict with
§ 1132(a). Rather, the parties did not even raise the saving clause as an
issue because the state law claim did not fall within the saving clause’s
scope.101 Instead, Ingersoll-Rand is a simple conflict preemption case
where ERISA’s preemption clause preempted an employee’s claim for
compensatory and punitive damages because the claim was “related to”
the ERISA plan given that it was “specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans” and that the existence of the plan was the
essence of the plaintiff’s claim.102
96. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
97. Id. at 66–67.
98. See id. (avoiding a discussion that ERISA’s saving clause was applicable to the
facts before the Court).
99. See id. at 66–67.
100. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
101. See id. at 140–41.
102. Id. at 140. The employee’s claim was premised upon an employer’s alleged
termination of the employee to avoid paying pension benefits to the employee. Id. at
135–36. In effect, the Court applied the “reference to” prong of the two-part definition
of “relate to.” The Court stated:
[W]e have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are
“specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans” are pre-empted under
§ 514 (a) [ERISA’s preemption clause]. . . . The Texas cause of action makes
specific reference to, and indeed is premised on, the existence of a pension
plan. In the words of the Texas court, the cause of action “allows recovery
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But, despite the fact that neither Russell, Taylor, nor Ingersoll-Rand
involves a direct conflict between § 1132(a) and a state law protected by
the saving clause, the Court has used statements and holdings from these
cases to imply that, when such a conflict does exist, § 1132(a) will
preempt an inconsistent state law. For example, in Rush, the Court
broadly interpreted Ingersoll-Rand to conclude that § 1132(a)’s purposes
and policies preempt any state law or lawsuit that provides remedies that
are different than those provided in § 1132(a).103 However, that
interpretation overlooks the fact that, in Ingersoll-Rand, the Court was
not faced with a direct conflict between § 1132(a) and a state law that is
within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.104 Therefore, IngersollRand’s conflict preemption discussion, and other general comments
about § 1132(a)’s purposes and policies, are not dispositive. Instead, the
decisive fact is that, unlike in Ingersoll-Rand, the language in both
ERISA’s saving clause and preemption clause establishes that Congress’
intent is that § 1132(a) does not preempt a state law that falls within the
scope of ERISA’s saving clause.105
Furthermore, the legislative history that the Court has previously
relied upon to assert that ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies are
exclusive, is not dispositive. In Taylor, the Court relied upon a portion
of ERISA’s legislative history that provides: “All such actions [for
when the plaintiff proves that the principal reason for his termination was the
employer’s desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the
employee’s pension fund. . . . Because the court’s inquiry must be directed to
the plan, this judicially created cause of action “relate[s] to” an ERISA plan.
Id. at 140 (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
103. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002). However, the
Court’s reliance upon Ingersoll-Rand is misplaced because the state law at issue was not
a state insurance regulation under ERISA’s saving clause; the only issue was whether
ERISA’s preemption clause preempted the state law claim because it related to an
ERISA plan. Despite this conclusion, the Court in Rush somehow tried to use IngersollRand as precedent that state laws which provide additional remedies are preempted
under Pilot Life’s dicta that § 1132(a) provides the only remedies for enforcement of
rights protected under ERISA. However, it should be noted that the Pilot Life Court
stated its dicta while it was discussing whether ERISA’s saving clause exempted
Mississippi’s bad faith law from preemption. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 51–57 (1987). Therefore, a case like Ingersoll-Rand, which does not involve
ERISA’s saving clause, should not be used to support an argument that § 1132(a)
preempts a saving clause-protected state law. As such, the Rush Court’s reliance upon
Ingersoll-Rand is misplaced because different considerations are involved when
determining whether ERISA’s preemption clause preempts a state law (as at issue in
Ingersoll-Rand) than when determining whether ERISA’s saving clause exempts a state
law from preemption, as is at issue when one considers whether a saving clauseprotected state law preempts § 1132(a). Therefore, the Rush Court’s attempt to use
Ingersoll-Rand to support its speculation about whether § 1132(a) would preempt a
saving clause-protected law is tantamount to mixing apples and oranges.
104. See Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 377.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79.
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denied benefits or for enforcement of rights to benefits] in Federal or
State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United
States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).”106 However, this
statement cannot be taken literally. First, given the presence of ERISA’s
saving clause, the most logical conclusion is that the statement about
section 301 is relevant only to a situation where the saving clause is
inapplicable.107 That is, by enacting a saving clause that exempts certain
state laws from ERISA’s preemption, Congress did not intend that
saving clause-protected laws “aris[e] under the laws of the United
States.”108 Instead, saving clause-protected laws are in furtherance of
Congress’ intent that states’ regulation of insurance shall control.109 No
one can seriously argue that a state law regulation that falls within the
saving clause’s scope arises under federal law. Such laws arise under
state law; therefore, ERISA’s legislative history comments about section
301 are irrelevant.110
A few more words are in order regarding other portions of ERISA’s
106. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1987) (quoting H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)).
107. The fact that the legislative history reference to section 301 is not applicable to
a saving clause-protected state law is shown by the clear language of ERISA’s
preemption clause which provides that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions shall not
supersede or preempt a state law within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause. See supra
notes 73–79. The irrelevancy of section 301 is especially shown if the Court’s canon of
interpretation—“when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, the first canon is
also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete’”—is applied. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
108. See text accompanying supra note 106. It seems only logical that saving
clause-protected laws, which states primarily enact under their insurance codes, arise
under state law. Therefore, there is no need for exclusive federal jurisdiction over a
lawsuit based upon such laws. Rather, state courts should have at least concurrent
jurisdiction to interpret state insurance regulations and to resolve lawsuits premised upon
such insurance regulations.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79. Therefore, the best conclusion is
that there should never be a complete preemption (for removal of a state lawsuit to
federal court as implied by ERISA’s legislative history references to section 301 of the
LMRA) of a state lawsuit that is premised upon a state law that is within the scope of
ERISA’s saving clause.
Likewise, a saving clause-protected state law should escape substantive preemption
under ERISA’s preemption clause. Nonpreemption is the clear import of the language
that Congress codified in ERISA’s preemption clause and in its saving clause. See id.
110. That a saving clause-protected law arises under state law is further supported
by ERISA’s preemption clause’s language which provides that ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions, including § 1132(a), should not preempt a state law that falls
within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
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legislative history that the Court has used to support its apparent belief
that § 1132(a) has preemptive effects over a saving clause-protected
state law. In addition to the Court’s improper reliance upon section 301,
the Court has identified at least three more principles that it has garnered
from its review of ERISA’s legislative history: (1) there is a need for
uniformity of regulation of ERISA remedies; (2) there is a need for
ERISA “administrators [to be able to] predict the legality of proposed
actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws”;111 and (3)
“[t]he expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations
under ERISA-regulated plans would develop . . . would make little sense if
the remedies available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under [§
1132(a)] could be supplemented or supplanted by varying state laws.”112
Despite the Court’s reliance upon these statements, such justifications do
not offer a persuasive reason for the Court’s apparent belief that § 1132(a)
preempts a saving clause-protected state law that offers remedies that are
different than the ones contained in § 1132(a).
First, the goal of uniform regulations, and of ERISA’s administrators’
ability to predict the parameters of applicable regulations, is already
restricted by the mere presence of ERISA’s saving clause, which
evidences Congress’ intent that ERISA benefit plans be subject to
varying regulations if different states enact inconsistent laws to govern
insurance companies, HMOs, and other entities that fall within the scope
of ERISA’s saving clause. Second, the belief that courts will develop
federal common law is not hampered by states’ enactment of saving
clause-protected laws granting remedies that are different than the
remedies of § 1132(a). In other words, courts will still be able to
develop common law when either there is no relevant saving clauseprotected state law, or when ERISA’s saving clause is not applicable, as
with self-insured ERISA plans.113
Therefore, given the presence of ERISA’s saving clause, which gives
states the authority to regulate insurance, the Court should be extremely
careful when it relies upon legislative history references regarding
uniformity and the development of common law. This is especially true
because giving too much weight to such references might impermissibly
undercut the policies that underlie Congress’ intent regarding the scope
of ERISA’s saving clause.
111. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (quoting 120 Cong.
Rec. 29933 (1974)).
112. Id. at 56.
113. Because of the deemer clause, states cannot use ERISA’s saving clause to
regulate self-insured ERISA plans. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Therefore,
state law remedies are not applicable to self-insured plans, and courts will be free to
develop common law to regulate such plans.
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V. THE COURT’S UNREASONABLE CONCERN ABOUT “ERISA
DESTROYING ITSELF”
Pursuant to the above discussion, there is no definitive reason why the
Court and lower-level federal courts should not enforce ERISA’s saving
clause to the fullest extent of its plain meaning language. If this means
that ERISA’s saving clause will destroy certain portions of ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions, then such destruction would be a necessary
consequence of Congress’ codification of a broad saving clause and a
broad preemption clause in the same statute. Therefore, to respect
Congress’ intent, the Court should avoid using judicial activism, in the
guise of statutory interpretation, to prevent the alleged destruction of
ERISA.114
However, it is doubtful that the Court will be able to resist the urge to
judicially legislate its own beliefs about the proper reconciliation of a
conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state law. But,
the cases that the Court has relied upon to support its belief about that
reconciliation are distinguishable. For example, in American Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.,115 the Court held that
the “filed rate doctrine,” under the Communication Act of 1934,
preempted both respondent’s state law breach of contract claim and state
law tortious interference with contract claim,116 and that the saving
clause of the Communication Act did not exempt the claims from
preemption.117 The Communication Act’s saving clause provided:
“Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the
remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions
of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”118 The Court held that
the saving clause did not save the state law claims from preemption
because those claims were “‘absolutely inconsistent with the provisions
of the act,’” and therefore “‘the act cannot be held to destroy itself.’”119
114. The Court has recognized that any disuniformity of regulation from an
application of ERISA’s saving clause is due to Congress’ putting the saving clause in the
same statute that also has a broad preemption clause. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 381 (asserting that “[s]uch disuniformities . . . are the inevitable
result of the congressional decision to ‘save’ local insurance regulation”) (quoting Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)) (alteration in original).
115. 524 U.S. 214 (1998).
116. Id. at 226–27.
117. Id. at 227–28.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (2000).
119. AT&T, 524 U.S. at 228 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
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Similarly, in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,120 the Court held that
section 20, the Carmack Amendment to the original Interstate Commerce
Act, preempted a Kentucky state law that would have invalidated a
carrier’s contract provision which limited the carrier’s liability for
damaged property.121 The Court found preemption because the Carmack
Amendment regulated a carrier’s liability to shippers,122 and because
Congress enacted the amendment to avoid a disuniformity of regulation
under different state laws.123 Relying upon the supremacy of federal
regulation of interstate commerce, the Court held that the Carmack
Amendment must preempt the inconsistent Kentucky state law.124
The Court rejected the shipper’s claim that a saving clause to the
Interstate Commerce Act saved Kentucky’s state law from preemption.125
That saving clause provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this part,
the remedies provided under this part are in addition to remedies existing
under another law or common law.”126 The Court held that the saving
clause could not save the Kentucky law because “[i]t would result in the
nullification of the regulation of a national subject and operate to
maintain the confusion of the diverse regulation which it was the
purpose of Congress to put an end to.”127 The Court asserted that the
saving clause preserves only those state laws that were “‘not inconsistent
with the rules and regulations prescribed by the provisions of [the]
act,’”128 and that “‘the act cannot be said to destroy itself.’”129
Regardless of the correctness of the Court’s decision as applied to the
specific facts at issue in Central Office Telephone and Croninger, the
Court’s broad statement about an act not being allowed to destroy itself
creates an excellent means by which the Court and lower-level courts
can engage in judicial lawmaking in contravention of Congress’ intent
regarding the scope of a particular saving clause and its impact on the

Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907). In the ERISA context, a saving clause-protected state
law that allows remedies that are different than those provided for in § 1132(a) would
not be “absolutely inconsistent with” § 1132(a) because, pursuant to the terms of
ERISA’s preemption clause, § 1132(a) would not be applicable. See supra text
accompanying notes 73–79. Therefore, there would be no ERISA statutory provision that
would be in conflict with the saving clause-protected law.
120. 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
121. See id. at 503–06.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 506.
124. Id. at 507.
125. Id. at 507–08.
126. Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13103 (2000).
127. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913).
128. Id. (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446
(1907)).
129. Id. (quoting Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. at 446).
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substantive provisions of a federal law.130 To limit courts’ abilities to
disregard congressional intent, Central Office Telephone’s and Croninger’s
statements about a federal statute not being allowed to destroy itself
must be evaluated in the context of the specific language of a federal
statute, including the statute’s preemption clause and saving clause. In
other words, if the language of a federal statute shows that Congress
intended that the statute’s saving clause exempt certain state laws from
preemption even when those state laws might be inconsistent with the
substantive provisions of the federal law itself, the Court should not, in
the guise of statutory interpretation, stand in the way of the execution of
that Congressional intent.131 For example, the plain meaning language
of ERISA’s saving clause provides that “nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”132 Given that § 1132(a)
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions is one of the provisions in “this
subchapter,” Congress’ intent, as expressed in both ERISA’s saving
clause and preemption clause,133 is that § 1132(a) should not preempt a
state law that regulates insurance.134
In deference to Congressional intent, the Court should avoid applying
its own rule of construction that a federal statute “cannot be held to
destroy itself.”135 Congress’ intent must control. If Congress, the body
charged with enacting federal statutes, wants a statute’s saving clause
(when applicable) to destroy certain portions of a statute, the Court, as
an interpreter of federal statutes, has no legitimate reason to complain
about a saving clause destroying a statute. This is especially true when a
statute has plain language that clearly shows that a saving clause and a
preemption clause broadly exempt certain state laws from preemption.
ERISA’s preemption clause specifically provides that the preemptive
effects of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions (§ 1132(a)), being a
130. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1181 n.10 (3rd
ed. 2000) (asserting that a court that does not enforce a saving clause as written “is
illegitimately disregarding the source of its authority and, regardless of where its
preemption inquiry leads, is pursuing a fundamentally lawless path”).
131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The word “any” should
be emphasized because Congress did not say that only consistent state laws are saved
from preemption; rather, all state laws that regulate insurance escape ERISA’s preemption.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79.
134. See id.
135. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913) (quoting Tex. &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907)).
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provision of “this subchapter,” is limited by ERISA’s saving clause, as
codified in subsection (b).136 In other words, the preemption clause
provides that except as provided in subsection (b) (ERISA’s saving
clause), § 1132(a) and certain other provisions of ERISA shall supersede
or preempt certain state laws.137 The saving clause, subsection (b), states
that “nothing in this subchapter (which includes § 1132(a) of ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions) shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.”138 Clearly, the language of ERISA’s saving clause and of
ERISA’s preemption clause is broad enough to exempt from preemption
a state insurance regulation that offers different remedies than § 1132(a).
Therefore, to the extent that the Court is an interpreter of laws and not a
drafter of laws, it should have no problem with adopting the plain
meaning interpretation that this Article has laid out, especially when one
considers that Congress can amend ERISA to avoid any alleged
destruction that might occur when a saving clause-protected state law
preempts one of ERISA’s substantive provisions.139
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
137. Id.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). See also supra text
accompanying notes 73–80.
139. In non-ERISA contexts, the Court has relied upon Congress’ ability to amend a
federal statute as a reason for not overruling an erroneously-decided precedent. See
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 362–63 (2000) (“The policy of stare
decisis is at its most powerful in statutory interpretation (which Congress is always free
to supersede with new legislation) . . . .”). Generally, the Author does not believe that a
future Congress’ ability to amend a federal statute is sufficient grounds for the Court’s
refusal to overrule an opinion that it has incorrectly decided by misinterpreting a past
Congress’ intent. See Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme
Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change,
53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 818–19 (2002) (criticizing the position that Congress’ future
ability to amend a statute should be used as justification for not overruling an
erroneously-decided statutory precedent). However, when applying a plain meaning
interpretation to a federal statute, the Author does believe that a present or future ability
by Congress to amend a federal statute is an important consideration. In contrast to a
situation where the Court upholds one of its erroneously-decided statutory interpretation
precedents (which the Court allegedly interpreted according to its understanding of the
enacting Congress’ intent) on the grounds that a future Congress can amend the statute if
it does not agree with the erroneous interpretation, applying a plain meaning
interpretation accepts the enacting Congress’ true intent regarding the scope of a statute.
By accepting the enacting Congress’ original intent, the Court will be true to its prior
statements that it will interpret a statute as written by Congress. Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993).
Furthermore, the Court should not have any qualms about the impact of its plain
meaning statutory interpretation—even when the Court fears that it should not interpret a
saving clause in such a manner as to destroy a federal statute’s substantive provisions—
because a future Congress can amend the statute to alleviate any undesirable effects from
the Court’s plain meaning interpretation. Such reliance upon a future Congress’ ability
to amend a statute when it does not like the Court’s plain meaning interpretation is
supportable because, unlike where the Court attempts to use stare decisis to avoid
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Of course, the Court can continue in its apparent belief that a saving
clause should not be allowed to destroy a statute, as the Court’s dictum
in Rush implies.140 The Court can even locate other cases to support its
efforts. For example, in a non-ERISA case, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’
Legal Committee,141 the Court stated “that neither an express preemption provision nor a saving clause ‘bar[s] the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles.’”142 But, the Court should not apply this
rule of construction such that a saving clause-protected state law will
never preempt an inconsistent federal statutory provision. A closer
examination of the rule shows that, for support, the Buckman Court
relied upon Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.143 But in doing so, the
Buckman Court should have recognized that, despite the Geier Court’s
statement that a saving clause and a preemption clause do not alter
traditional conflict preemption, the Geier Court acknowledged that
Congress’ intent is controlling. For example, the Geier Court stated:
“Nothing in the language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save
state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations.”144 From
this quote, it is clear that Congress’ intent, as expressed in the language
of preemption clauses and saving clauses, is the paramount factor that
should control the Court’s decision on whether a saving clause will
exempt an inconsistent state law from preemption, including whether a
saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions.
Therefore, the Court should not use its own rules of construction to
overruling an erroneously-decided precedent, reliance upon a future Congress’ ability to
amend a statute to avoid an unwanted plain meaning interpretation (that is a correct
interpretation) is not an effort to support a Court’s erroneously-decided interpretation
about a past Congress’ intent. Instead, it is an effort to defer to the original plain
meaning congressional intent of a statute with the assurance that a future Congress can
amend the statute to promote its own beliefs about the future scope of the statute, even
when the belief is different from the intent of the enacting Congress.
140. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377–78 (2002).
141. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
142. Id. at 352 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000))
(alteration in original). This statement by the Court seems to be based upon its belief
that the Supremacy Clause controls when there is a conflict between a state law and a
federal law even when Congress has shown an intent that the state law should escape
federal preemption. As such, this statement appears to be inconsistent with other cases
by the Court that resolve federal preemption issues by a statutory construction of Congress’
intent in favor of or against preemption. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
143. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See also Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352.
144. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (emphasis added).

625

PITTMAN.DOC

9/10/2019 3:30 PM

thwart Congress’ intent, especially given that there is no non-Court
manufactured authority for the Geier Court’s statement that “this Court
has repeatedly ‘decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where
doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by
federal law.’”145 One wonders from whom the Court obtained its
authority to not give broad effect to a saving clause, especially when a
saving clause’s language would allow a broad exemption from federal
preemption.
Judge Richard A. Posner’s comments are possibly instructive. “The
Supreme Court is a political court. The discretion that the justices exercise
can fairly be described as legislative in character, but the conditions
under which this ‘legislature’ operates are different from those of
Congress.”146 Unless the Court wants to be a superlegislature, is there
any legitimate reason for the Court not to interpret a saving clause as
broadly as its language allows, especially when the Court professes that
Congressional intent guides its statutory interpretation and that statutory
language is the clearest indication of Congressional intent?147 At the very
least, the Court should be cautious when using its judicial-lawmaking
authority to restrict the scope of ERISA’s saving clause. Along these
lines, the Court should not use the Supremacy Clause to limit the reach
of the saving clause.
VI. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE DOES NOT RESTRICT THE SCOPE OF
ERISA’S SAVING CLAUSE
The Supremacy Clause provides:
145. Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000)) (alteration
in original).
146. Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27,
30 (reviewing BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS (2003)) (emphasis added). More fully, Judge Posner states:
The Supreme Court is a political court. The discretion that the justices
exercise can fairly be described as legislative in character, but the conditions
under which this “legislature” operates are different from those of Congress.
Lacking electoral legitimacy, yet wielding Zeus’s thunderbolt in the form of
the power to invalidate actions of the other branches of government as
unconstitutional, the justices, to be effective, have to accept certain limitations
on their legislative discretion. They are confined, in Holmes’s words, from
molar to molecular motions. And even at the molecular level the justices have
to be able to offer reasoned justifications for departing from their previous
decisions, and to accord a decent respect to public opinion, and to allow room
for social experimentation, and to formulate doctrines that will provide
guidance to lower courts, and to comply with the expectations of the legal
profession concerning the judicial craft. They have to be seen to be doing law
rather than doing politics.
Id.
147. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.148

It appears that the Court may try to use the Supremacy Clause to limit
the application of ERISA’s saving clause. In asserting that a saving
clause in a federal statute cannot be used to destroy the substantive
provisions of the federal statute,149 the Court’s reasoning appears to be
based upon two propositions. The first proposition involves whether
Congress intended that a saving clause-protected law preempts a
substantive provision of a federal statute. The other is whether the
Supremacy Clause prevents Congress from enacting saving clauses in
federal laws that exempt state laws from federal preemption when the
state laws conflict with the federal laws’ substantive provisions.
Regarding the first proposition, the plain meaning language of
ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses shows that Congress did intend
that a saving clause-protected state law can preempt certain ERISA
substantive provisions, including § 1132(a).150 It should be noted that
the Court has already recognized that the interplay between ERISA’s
preemption clause and saving clause is unusual in that Congress does not
normally take away an area of regulation from the states, as done in
ERISA’s preemption clause, and then return a portion of that regulation
to the states, as done in ERISA’s saving clause.151 However, implicit
from the fact that Congress included ERISA’s saving clause within
ERISA’s statutory framework is the notion that Congress intended that
some state laws avoid ERISA’s preemption. The only open issue is
whether Congress intended that courts interpret and apply ERISA’s
saving clause as broadly as the language contained in ERISA’s
preemption clause and saving clause. As argued above, a plain meaning
148. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
149. See supra text accompanying note 90.
150. See supra text accompanying note 73.
151. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985). The
Court stated:
The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their faces, perhaps are
not a model of legislative drafting, for while the general pre-emption clause
broadly pre-empts state law, the saving clause appears broadly to preserve the
States’ lawmaking power over much of the same regulation. While Congress
occasionally decides to return to the States what it has previously taken away,
it does not normally do both at the same time.
Id.
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interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause provides
that Congress intended that ERISA’s saving clause be broadly applied,
with ERISA’s deemer clause being the only limitation on the scope of
the saving clause,152 a position that the Court accepted in its earlier cases
where the scope of ERISA’s saving clause was interpreted.153
Therefore, given Congress’ explicit intent regarding the scope of
ERISA’s saving clause, the Court should not use the Supremacy Clause
to thwart that intent.
In considering whether the Supremacy Clause prevents the enforcement
of a broad, plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause, the
Court should be mindful that the Supremacy Clause has different
implications depending upon the types of federal and state laws at issue.
One category of federal laws is comprised of laws that regulate areas
that the United States Constitution explicitly reserves for federal control.
Such exclusive federal regulation includes such areas as the authority to
make treaties with foreign countries and the authority to coin money.154
In these and other exclusive areas of federal regulation, Congress could
not enact a law or a saving clause that would give states the authority to
make treaties, coin money, or do anything else that would contravene an
explicit constitutional provision.155 Instead, only an amendment to the
constitution would avoid a preemption of a state law that is in conflict
with an explicit constitutional provision.156 One might call this type of
federal preemption “explicit federal preemption.”
On the other hand, when there is no explicit constitutional provision
that proscribes state laws in a particular area, the Supremacy Clause
should not prevent Congress from enacting federal laws that contain
saving clauses that relegate certain areas for state law control, as
Congress did when enacting ERISA’s saving clause. Instead of “explicit
federal preemption,” one might call this area of preemption “discretionary
federal preemption.” The preemption is discretionary because, while
legislating in areas within its legislative authority, Congress should have
great discretion when deciding whether it should preempt state laws or
whether it should allow state law regulation in certain areas. To deny
Congress such discretion would be inconsistent with Congress’ powers
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to make those laws that it deems
necessary to carry out its constitutional legislative authority.157
152. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 29–41.
154. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1021.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1021–23 n.5.
157. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that Congress shall have the power
“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
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Before eroding Congress’ powers to save certain state laws from
federal preemption, the Court should interpret the Supremacy Clause in
light of the fears, concerns, and purposes that motivated the founders to
include the Supremacy Clause as a part of the proposed U.S. Constitution.
For example, in Federalist Paper No. 33, Alexander Hamilton spoke of the
interconnection between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Supremacy Clause; and, the gist of his discussion is that the founders
devised these clauses to ensure that states would not enact laws that
would destroy or undermine the national government’s supreme
authority to create necessary and proper federal laws.158 Hamilton states:
The Convention probably foresaw what it has been a principal aim of these
papers to inculcate that the danger which most threatens our political welfare, is,
that the State Governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and
might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to
construction.159

The debate among the founders during the drafting of the Federal
Constitution shows that Hamilton’s comments are correct. One of the
founders’ chief motivating reasons for drafting the Supremacy Clause
was to prevent states from entering into treaties with foreign countries,
from violating treaties that the federal government might enter into with
foreign countries, and from enacting state laws that conflicted with
federal laws that Congress might enact.160 It appears that, in drafting the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18.
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204–05 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
159. Id. at 205–06.
160. 2 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1459–60 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed.,
1986). The notes of some of the founders show that the Supremacy Clause was
primarily motivated by state laws that attempted to undermine federal authority:
MR. PINCKNEY moved “that the National Legislature should have authority to
negative all laws which they should judge to be improper.” He urged that such
a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual;
that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States
were left to act of themselves in any case, it would be impossible to defend the
national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the acts
of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped
repeated violations; that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of
an efficient national Government; that under the British Government the
negative of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the States are more one
nation now, than the Colonies were then.
Id. at 1459. Additionally, the notes show the following:
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Supremacy Clause, the founders were attempting to promote the
supremacy of the federal government over hostile state governments;
they were mindful that some states would resist federal authority and
seek to promote their own political and economic well-being to the
detriment of the federal government.161 Therefore, instead of interpreting
ERISA’s saving clause and the Supremacy Clause’s impact on the
saving clause in a vacuum, the Court should construe the Supremacy
Clause in light of the anti-state encroachment on federal authority policy
that motivated the founders’ drafting of the Supremacy Clause. In doing
so, the Court should acknowledge that the anti-state encroachment
policy is not implicated when Congress enacts a federal statute like
ERISA which contains a broad saving clause that allows states to enact
laws that preempt some of ERISA’s statutory provisions.
The policy underlying the Supremacy Clause is not implicated because
the founders did not appear to be concerned with Congress itself granting
states, through a saving clause, the authority to operate in particular
areas that do not conflict with constitutional provisions that explicitly
and exclusively reserve certain areas for federal regulation.162 Rather,
MR. MADISON seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite
power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a
perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to
encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the
rights and interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their
respective jurisdictions.
Id. See also JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 142 (1966) (discussing the states’ violations of federal treaties with foreign
countries and, in part, stating as follows: “The tendency of the States to these violations
has been manifested in sundry instances”).
After much debate over whether to give the federal government the power to review
and negate an improper state law before it became an enforceable law, the founders
decided against such a power, but they apparently drafted the Supremacy Clause to
achieve the same result—a means of preventing states from undermining the federal
government by enacting inconsistent state laws and by making and violating treaties with
foreign governments. See 2 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra, at 1468–82.
161. 2 1787 DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 160, at 1461. Mr. Wilson,
one of the founders, states:
No sooner were the State Governments formed than their jealousy and
ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavoured to cut a slice from
the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation
became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands.
Review the progress of the articles of Confederation through Congress and
compare the first and last draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of
this convention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the
whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily
sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each
part, and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local
interests?
Id. at 1461–62.
162. See id. at 1450–82.
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the founders’ concern was with states enacting inconsistent laws and
violating treaties, in opposition to Congress’ intent, when such state
action was in contravention of a system of government based upon the
supremacy of federal authority and laws.163
Furthermore, a court interpretation that Congress cannot enact a
federal statute that has a saving clause, which saves certain state laws
from preemption, would undermine Congress’ authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.164 Such a decision would substantially
limit Congress’ discretion and ability to enact the types of laws that it
deems necessary to protect its citizens. Congress would have less authority
to strike the appropriate balance between state regulation and federal
regulation. For example, in the ERISA context, Congress could no
longer enforce its desire for complete state regulation of insurance,
despite its apparent policy choice that states are in a better position to
regulate insurance.165 Clearly, ERISA’s saving clause’s mandate—that
states can regulate insurance—is a policy decision that Congress has
made to further its legislative authority to regulate ERISA plans for the
protection of its citizens. If Congress thinks that it is necessary and
proper for it to defer to state authority regarding insurance regulations,
the Supremacy Clause should not be used to prevent or limit Congress’
discretion in deciding the best means of protecting its citizens’ ERISA
plans. This is especially true because ERISA’s saving clause is not
within the scope of “explicit federal preemption,” as the saving clause
does not conflict with any provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
Therefore, the Supremacy Clause is not implicated because its anti-state
encroachment policy is not harmed when Congress, in its wisdom as the
federal legislative body, and not a state government, has allowed state
regulation in a particular area.
The Court should recognize that the real justification for its prior
dictum, that an ERISA saving clause-protected law will not preempt an
inconsistent ERISA statutory provision, is the Court’s misguided efforts
to enforce the Supremacy Clause when the Supremacy Clause is really
not implicated in this area of discretionary federal preemption.166 The
163. See id.
164. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
165. This conclusion flows from the mere fact that Congress included the saving
clause in ERISA’s statutory framework.
166. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377 (2002) (“Although
we have yet to encounter a forced choice between the congressional policies of
exclusively federal remedies and the ‘reservation of the business of insurance to the
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Court’s effort is misguided because, in the zone of discretionary federal
preemption, the Supremacy Clause has no legal force or effect that is
separate and distinct from Congress’ intent regarding the permissible
scope of state law regulation.167 When discretionary federal preemption
is applicable, the terms and conditions of federal statutes are the
cornerstone of a federal preemption analysis under the Supremacy
Clause.168 If Congress wants inconsistent state law regulation in a
certain field, the Supremacy Clause does not prevent Congress from
drafting a statute that allows such inconsistent state law regulation.169
States,’ [Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21 (1985)], we have
anticipated such a conflict, with the state insurance regulation losing out if it allows plan
participants ‘to obtain remedies . . . that Congress rejected in ERISA.’”) (quoting Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 100 (1993) (asserting that “in the case of a direct
conflict [between a state law and one of ERISA’s statutory provisions], federal
supremacy principles require that state law yield”) (citation omitted). See also Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2000) (“As the Supreme Court and
virtually all commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is the reason that
valid federal statutes trump state law.”). But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 785 (1994) (asserting that “[t]he Necessary and
Proper Clause, and not the Supremacy Clause, provides the source and constitutional
justification for Congress’s power to preempt state lawmaking capacity”).
167. In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the Court stated:
We must decide whether these provisions [including ERISA’s preemption
clause, section 1140, and section 502(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement
provision], singly or in combination, pre-empt the cause of action at issue in
this case. “[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by
federal law is one of congressional intent. ‘The purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone.’”
498 U.S. 133, 137–38 (1990) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208
(1985)) (emphasis added).
168. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
169. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that
Congress can enact a federal statute with a saving clause that preserves state laws that
are inconsistent with a statute’s substantive provisions:
Insofar as petitioners’ argument would permit common-law actions that
“actually conflict” with federal regulations, it would take from those who
would enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve the law’s
congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the
operation of ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to protect. To the extent
that such an interpretation of the saving provision reads into a particular
federal law toleration of a conflict that those principles would otherwise forbid,
it permits that law to defeat its own objectives, or potentially, as the Court has
put it before, to “destroy itself.” [Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel.,
Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998).] We do not claim that Congress lacks the
constitutional power to write a statute that mandates such a complex type of
state/federal relationship. But there is no reason to believe Congress has done
so here.
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
In support of the possibility that Congress has the authority to enact a saving clause
under which state law can preempt federal law, as shown in the above quote, the Court
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And, if Congress wants to create a saving clause, like ERISA’s saving
clause, which provides for state law preemption of such ERISA statutory
provisions as § 1132(a), the Supremacy Clause would not block the
enforcement of such a law.170 This is true because the Supremacy
relied upon footnote 16, which provides:
The Court contends, in essence, that a saving clause cannot foreclose implied
conflict pre-emption. The cases it cites to support that point, however, merely
interpreted the language of the particular saving clauses at issue and concluded
that those clauses did not foreclose implied pre-emption; they do not establish
that a saving clause in a given statute cannot foreclose implied pre-emption
based on frustration of that statute’s purposes, or even (more importantly for
our present purposes) that a saving clause in a given statute cannot deprive a
regulation issued pursuant to that statute of any implicit pre-emptive effect. As
stated in the text, I believe the language of this particular saving clause
unquestionably limits, and possibly forecloses entirely, the pre-emptive effect
that safety standards promulgated by the Secretary have on common-law
remedies. Under that interpretation, there is by definition no frustration of
federal purposes—that is, no “tolerat[ion of] actual conflict,”—when tort suits
are allowed to go forward. Thus, because there is a textual basis for concluding
that Congress intended to preserve the state law at issue, I think it entirely
appropriate for the party favoring pre-emption to bear a special burden in
attempting to show that valid federal purposes would be frustrated if that state
law were not pre-empted.
Id. at 900 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
170. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Professor Laurence H. Tribe has
expressed his opinion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in which Congress relegated the
business of insurance to state law regulation (and pursuant to which Congress enacted
ERISA’s saving clause), possibly runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause. TRIBE, supra
note 130, at 1022 n.5. Professor Tribe states:
An important federal statute that comes close to raising that constitutional
difficulty (and, indeed, perhaps crosses the line) is the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), which protects certain kinds of state laws—namely,
those enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”—from
being “invalidated[d], impair[ed], or supersede[d]” by any other federal statute,
including one enacted by a future Congress, that does not “specifically relat[e]
to the business of insurance.” If McCarran-Ferguson were read as its text
plainly suggests Congress meant it to be—as giving certain insurance-related
state laws a privileged place with respect to statutes promulgated by future
Congresses—it would violate both the principle that Congress may not by
statute repeal the Supremacy Clause and the principle that one Congress may
not bind its successors. Perhaps to avoid this awkward result, the courts have
characterized McCarran-Ferguson as merely an interpretive guide for assessing
the preemptive effect of federal statutes—and a guide which future Congresses
may freely override.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)) (alterations in original). However, Professor Tribe
does recognize that Congress can avoid violation of the Supremacy Clause by
incorporating the relevant state law regulation into the relevant federal statute:
To be precise, because the Supremacy Clause entails the conclusion that any
valid federal statute prevails over any state law with which it conflicts,
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including a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the insurance
business regardless of whether that federal statute deals specifically with the
business of insurance, the only clearly constitutional way that Congress can
preserve a state law regulating insurance from being overridden by a statute
Congress enacts that conflicts with the state law is to eliminate the conflict by
specifying, in the congressional statute itself, that state laws such as the one in
question are to remain operative, thereby essentially incorporating the state
law in question into the federal statute. . . . For Congress to attempt to alter
the background rule under which any federal statute automatically supersedes
any state law with which it conflicts—which is, after all, a rule of
constitutional law giving operative meaning to the Supremacy Clause itself—is
for Congress to seek to do by statute what the Constitution clearly requires an
amendment to accomplish.
Id. at 1023 n.5 (emphasis added).
Under Professor Tribe’s rationale, Congress’ enactment of ERISA’s saving clause,
which is premised upon the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s relegation of the business of
insurance to state law regulation, survives preemption by the Supremacy Clause. This is
because, by including ERISA’s saving clause within ERISA’s statutory provisions,
Congress, through the saving clause, has incorporated state law regulation of insurance
within ERISA’s statutory framework, thereby making state law regulation of insurance a
part of ERISA’s substantive provisions. Given the incorporation of state law regulation
of insurance into ERISA’s statutory scheme, the only remaining question should be
whether Congress intended that ERISA’s saving clause be interpreted such that, in
regulating insurance, states can offer compensatory and punitive damages that are not
allowable under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s statutory provisions. Pursuant to a plain meaning
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, the answer is that
Congress did intend states to have the authority to grant such damages. See supra text
accompanying notes 73–79.
This Author accepts Professor Tribe’s incorporation theory, as informed by a plain
meaning interpretation of the scope of ERISA’s saving clause and ERISA’s preemption
clause which, as argued above, would allow a state to grant compensatory and punitive
damages despite the fact that these damages are not allowable under § 1132(a).
However, this Author believes that another way of resolving the issue is by accepting
that, when Congress enacted ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, it attempted
to make a distinction between ERISA plans that are regulated by state law under the
saving clause and ERISA plans that are not regulated by state law under the saving
clause. Given the distinction, the next logical conclusion is that Congress intended that
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions be applicable only when an ERISA plan is not
subject to state law regulation under ERISA’s saving clause. This conclusion is
appropriate because it is consistent with the plain meaning language of ERISA’s
preemption clause and saving clause, and because it is the one interpretation that would
enforce ERISA and its saving clause to the fullest extent of its permissible construction.
Furthermore, the Court has already recognized that, through ERISA’s saving clause,
states can regulate insurance ERISA plans (that are funded with insurance policies and
with HMOs’ coverage that is insurance-like) and that states cannot regulate self-insured
ERISA plans because such a distinction is the best reconciliation of the mandates of
ERISA’s saving clause and deemer clause. Consistent with that distinction, the Court
should acknowledge that, to give full force and effect to the plain meaning language of
ERISA’s saving clause, preemption clause, and to § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement
provisions, the best interpretation is that § 1132(a) remedies apply only to self-insured
plans and to other plans that do not fall within the scope of permissible state law
regulation of insurance under ERISA’s saving clause. Consistently, when an ERISA
plan does fall within a permissible state regulation of insurance under ERISA’s saving
clause, the Court should hold that § 1132(a) is not applicable and that states are free to
provide compensatory and punitive damage remedies to an injured beneficiary. This
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Clause is not self-executing to the extent that a federal statute must
always preempt inconsistent state laws, even when Congress—through
its intent as expressed in the language of saving clauses—wants to
preserve the inconsistent state laws. The conclusion is all the more true
when one interprets the Supremacy Clause in light of its anti-state
encroachment policy, which is not implicated and should not be used to
override a Congressional enactment when Congress, in the exercise of
its “discretionary federal preemption” authority, has struck a balance in
favor of state law regulation even when, as with ERISA’s saving clause,
the state law might preempt ERISA’s statutory provisions.
Given the above discussion, it seems logical that a saving clause and a
preemption clause, regardless of the scope of their coverage, are the
decisive authority for determining when federal preemption occurs.
Another way of saying this is that, when a federal statute’s saving clause
exempts certain state laws from federal preemption, it is as if the federal
statute no longer applies to the exempted areas of state law regulation.171
And therefore, the Supremacy Clause would not mandate federal
preemption of those exempted state laws because the Supremacy Clause
requires preemption only when a federal statue is applicable and when

distinction between when § 1132(a) is applicable, and when it is not applicable, gives the
fullest meaning to the language of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, just as
the distinction between insurance plans and self-insurance plans give the broadest
meaning to ERISA’s saving clause and deemer clause.
Furthermore, Professor Tribe appears to be of the opinion that a court should strictly
interpret a federal statute’s saving clause to enforce Congress’ intent against preemption
of state laws that fall within the saving clause’s scope:
To engage in such a broader inquiry is to forget that preemption is ultimately a
matter of construing a federal statute; when the statute contains its own clearly
applicable preemption or anti-preemption provision, a court that fails to give
that provision dispositive effect and instead applies its own preemption criteria
is illegitimately disregarding the source of its authority and, regardless of
where its preemption inquiry leads, is pursuing a fundamentally lawless path.
TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1181 n.10 (emphasis added).
171. Professor Tribe appears to say that, instead of the federal statute not being
applicable to the areas that have been relegated to state regulation, the federal statute
incorporates the state law. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1023 n.5. However, in the context
of whether a saving clause-protected state law preempts § 1132(a), analytically it might
be better to say that § 1132(a), and the other provisions of subchapters I and III of
ERISA, are not applicable because ERISA’s preemption clause states that § 1132(a) and
the provisions of subchapters I and III supersede (are applicable) “[e]xcept as provided
in subsection (b) of this section,” subsection (b) being ERISA’s saving clause. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (2000). The gist of this statement is that such ERISA provisions are not
applicable if a state law falls within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.
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there is an inconsistent state law that is not saved from preemption.172
This conclusion applies to ERISA’s saving clause and to whether a
state law can preempt § 1132(a). More specifically, an ERISA’s saving
clause-protected state law that imposes remedies that are different than
the remedies that § 1132(a) imposes should not be preempted by § 1132(a)
because § 1132(a) is not applicable, given that Congress—through ERISA’s
saving clause and ERISA’s preemption clause—gave states the authority
to regulate insurance, which should include the regulation of the
remedies to which an injured beneficiary is entitled.173
To the extent that the Court, through an alleged statutory construction,
attempts to apply the Supremacy Clause to thwart Congress’ intent
regarding ERISA’s saving clause and state law regulation of insurance,
this would be impermissible judicial lawmaking. The Court has no
legitimate authority to overrule Congressional intent by making its own
laws that are premised upon its own beliefs about the proper balance to
be struck in areas involving public policy choices that Congress has
resolved in favor of state law regulation of insurance.174
In the final analysis, it should be noted that using the Supremacy
Clause to prevent an expansive application of ERISA’s saving clause,
one which preempts § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions,
would be inconsistent with the Court’s precedents regarding federal
preemption. In the ERISA context, as in other areas of the law, the Court
has considered issues regarding a federal statute’s preemption of state
law as a matter of statutory interpretation or construction of the relevant
federal statute.175 The decisive question has been whether Congress, in the
172. In other words, if Congress, by reserving certain areas for state law regulation,
intends that federal law not control in such areas, there will be no conflict between the
state law and the federal law because, in those areas, the federal law is inapplicable and
nonexistent; therefore, there is no applicable federal law to conflict with the saved state
law.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79. § 1132(a) is not applicable because
the clear and plain language of ERISA’s preemption clause provides that § 1132(a),
being a section of subchapter one, shall not preempt state laws that fall within the scope
of ERISA’s saving clause. See id.
174. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1181 n.10 (asserting that “when the statute
contains its own clearly applicable preemption or anti-preemption provision, a
court that fails to give that provision dispositive effect and instead applies its
own preemption criteria is illegitimately disregarding the source of its
authority and, regardless of where its preemption inquiry leads, is pursuing a
fundamentally lawless path.”).
Id.
175. For an example of the Court’s reliance on statutory construction in the ERISA
preemption context, see New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Insurance, 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (asserting that “[s]ince pre-emption
claims turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory
construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the
structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs”) (citation omitted); Pilot Life Ins.
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statute’s language, legislative history, or structure of the statute, intended
to preempt state law in a particular area.176 If the statute’s language is
clear as to Congressional intent, the Court mostly defers to that intent.177
The same should apply for issues involving ERISA’s saving clause’s
preemptive effects on § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.
Therefore, if the Court continues using statutory construction as a means
of determining ERISA’s preemption and saving clause issues, and if it
applies its rule that unambiguous statutory provisions should be
interpreted as written,178 the Court would be justified in holding that,
pursuant to a plain meaning interpretation, Congress intended that a
saving clause-protected state law preempts § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions.179
The Court should recognize that if Congress had wanted to limit the
reach of ERISA’s saving clause, such that a saving clause-protected state
law would be preempted if it conflicts with § 1132(a), then Congress
would have written such a limitation into the language of either ERISA’s
preemption clause or saving clause. For example, Congress wrote the
limitation into the saving clause contained in section 78bb(a) of the
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (stating that “[t]he question whether a certain
state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. ‘The purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone’”) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 208 (1985)). In the non-ERISA context, for examples of the Court’s use of
statutory construction, see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001)
(“In these cases, our task is to identify the domain expressly pre-empted, because ‘an
express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute . . . supports a reasonable
inference . . . that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters.’ Congressional
purpose is the ‘ultimate touchstone’ of our inquiry.”) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996)
(“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.
[Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.] As a result, any understanding of the scope of a preemption statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530. Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the
language of the pre-emption statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.”)
(quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
176. See Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 655 (asserting that “[s]ince pre-emption claims
turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction
with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and
purpose of the Act in which it occurs”) (citations omitted).
177. See supra text accompanying note 63.
178. See id.
179. It should be noted that, in drafting ERISA’s preemption clause and saving
clause, Congress did not put any limitations on the scope of the saving clause, other than
ERISA’s deemer clause. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which preserves state jurisdiction over
“any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”180 If
Congress could write such a limitation into a 1934 statute, then there is
no reason to believe that it could not have written the limitation into a
1974 statute like ERISA. The analogy of section 78bb(a) to an absence
of the same limitation in ERISA’s saving clause is persuasive. When the
analogy is considered in light of the plain, unambiguous language of
ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, the Court should hold
that Congress did not intend that § 1132(a) be a limitation on the
enforcement of a saving clause-protected state law that offers remedies
that are different than the remedies offered by § 1132(a). In other words,
ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause clearly show Congress’
intent that a saving clause-protected state law preempts § 1132(a) of
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.
As a final point, to the extent that the Court might try to say that the
“structure and purpose of [ERISA] as a whole,” and the Court’s
“reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business,
consumers, and the law,”181 show a Congressional intent that § 1132(a)
preempts an inconsistent saving clause-protected law, the Court should
use caution by acknowledging at least two of the principles that have
controlled its discretion when deciding whether Congress intended to
preempt state law. First, there is a presumption that Congress did not
intend to preempt traditional state police powers regulations unless
Congress’ intent is clearly and manifestly shown.182 In light of this
presumption, the Court should resolve any ambiguity, about whether §
1132(a) preempts an inconsistent saving clause-protected state law,
180. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (emphasis added).
Section 78bb(a), in relevant parts, provides:
[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State
over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id. (emphasis added).
181. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (asserting that “[a]lso
relevant, however, is the ‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as revealed not
only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect
business, consumers, and the law”) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).
182. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“[W]e have worked on the ‘assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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against such preemption.183 Along these lines, to the extent that the Court
does not accept that a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption
clause and saving clause shows a Congressional intent that a saving
clause-protected law can preempt § 1132(a)’s remedies, at a minimum
the Court should recognize that Congress’ inclusion of a broad saving
clause within ERISA’s statutory framework, when § 1132(a) exists in
the same framework, shows that there is ambiguity regarding Congress’
intent as to whether § 1132(a) preempts a saving clause-protected law.
Therefore, the Court should apply the presumption against preemption of
the state law and construe ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause
to the fullest extent of their plain meaning language.184
Second, any attempt by the Court (other than one applying the presumption
against preemption) to resolve any alleged ambiguity over the preemptive
effects of § 1132(a), by using the Court’s “reasoned understanding of the
way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory
scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law,”185 is doomed to fail.
Not only will such an attempt lead to judicial lawmaking where the
Court, itself, will make the public policy decision regarding how the
balance should be struck regarding § 1132(a)’s preemptive effect,186 but
such an attempt to save Congress from its own failure to more clearly
draft the preemption clause and saving clause—to the extent that a plain
183. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 592 n.1 (2001).
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the
Court’s reluctance to find pre-emption where Congress has not spoken directly
to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though
ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not whether Congress intended to
pre-empt state regulation, but to what extent. We do not, absent unambiguous
evidence, infer a scope of pre-emption beyond that which clearly is mandated
by Congress’ language.
Id. (emphasis added).
It should be noted that the position taken in this Article is that ERISA’s preemption
clause and saving clause clearly and unambiguously show a congressional intent that a
saving clause-protected state law can preempt §1132(a)’s remedies. As such, this Article
discusses any ambiguity that the Court might allege because of the inclusion of ERISA’s
saving clause in the same statute that contains §1132(a) only as a fall-back position. In
other words, even if the Court were to find that ERISA is ambiguous regarding whether a
saving clause-protected state law can preempt §1132(a), any such ambiguity should be
construed in favor of a saving clause-protected state law’s preemption of §1132(a),
pursuant to the presumption against the preemption of states’ police powers regulations.
184. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
185. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
186. For criticism of such judicial lawmaking by the Court when interpreting
express preemption clauses and express saving clauses, see TRIBE, supra note 130, at
1181 n.10.
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meaning interpretation, as proposed in this Article, is not clear enough—will
simply further delay the time when Congress will be forced to revisit
ERISA’s statutory language and make whatever changes are needed to
more clearly state its intent regarding the scope of ERISA’s preemption
clause and saving clause, and these clauses’ impact on § 1132(a) of
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. As long as the Court continues
to bail out Congress from the confusion surrounding ERISA’s preemption,
there will be no urgency for Congress to clarify any ambiguity that
currently exists in ERISA’s preemption framework. Given that Congress
has shown that it can amend or change preemption clauses to make them
more workable as time passes,187 the Court and lower-level federal courts,
consistent with the presumption against preemption when Congress’
intent to preempt is not clear and manifest, should apply a plain meaning
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, and hold
that a saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s
civil enforcement provisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
At some point in the future, the Court and lower-level federal courts
will have to decide whether an ERISA’s saving clause-protected state
law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.
This is one of the most important ERISA preemption issues that remains
unresolved. In resolving the issue, all courts should apply a plain meaning
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause. Such an
interpretation will be broader than what currently exists. And, using that
broad interpretation, some states might enact laws similar to the
hypothetical statute that appears at the beginning of this Article. States
might codify such statutes to provide employees and their beneficiaries
with a cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages stemming
from an insurance company’s or HMO’s failure to follow the rules and
procedures that such statutes mandate. These compensatory and punitive
damages will be very beneficial to many injured employees and
beneficiaries who presently do not have access to such damages under §
1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.188 The main theme of
this Article is that states, pursuant to the plain meaning language of
187. A good example of Congress’ ability to amend or change preemption clauses is
shown by Congress’ changing of the preemption clause contained in the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2000). See
Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541–45 (discussing the different changes that Congress
has made to the FCLAA).
188. Under § 1132(a), an employee or beneficiary is entitled to only the monetary
value of denied benefits and not to compensatory damages. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 260–61 (1993).
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ERISA’s saving clause and preemption clause, should have the authority
to enact statutes that preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement
provisions.
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